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In this paper an empirical version of a job search model with endogenously
determined search intensity is presented. First, the theoretical model is formulated
aFter which an empirical specification is chosen in which data on unemployment
duration, job tenure and income, as well as indicators for the intensity of search,
like the monthly number of applications, are used to study the influence of the
intensity of search on labour market transitions.
"Che Central E3ureau for Statistics is thanked for providing the data1
1 Introduction
In this paper an empirical model of job search is presented in which the intensity of
search is determined endogenously by the individual decision maker. Individuals decide
on both Lhe arnount of effort that they spend on search activities and on whether or not.
to accept a job offer, as opposed to the standard job search model, see e.g. McKenna
(1985), in which the emphasis is on the job acceptance decision only.
In the literature, various models ofjob search with endogenously determined intensity
of search have appeared. Burdett and Mortensen (1978) present a model in which the
total time endowment is divided in time spent on labour, leisure time and time spent
on search. By increasing the time spent on search individuals can increase the average
number of job offers arriving in a given time interval. At the same time, however,
they have to incur a utility loss because an increase in time spent on search implíes a
decrease in leisure time. Individuals determine the optimal amount of time spent on
search by determining the optimal trade-off between the returns in the form of expected
job offers and the cost due to the loss of leisure time. This trade-off between cost of
search and returns of search is common to all models on search intensity that have
appeared in literature. In Mortsenen (1986) a simpler version of the same model is
presented. Instead of expressing search intensity in terms of time spent on search, he
defines search intensity much more loosely in terms of nsearch effortn. An explicit cost
of se.arch function is formulated and again an increase in search effort raises the job
offer arrival rate. Yoon (1981) also specifies a cost of search function. He estimates a
model of unemployment duration in which a measure of search intensity (nThe number of
places looked for a job in the past few weeks" ) appears as an explanatory variable in the
hazard rate and he finds a significant negative effect, i.e. an increase in the intensity of
search tends to reduce the duration of unemployment. Lindeboom and Theeuwes (1992)
specify a reduced form model in which data on the number of search contacts appears
in the hazard rate. The emphasis in their study is on detecting the relation between the
intensity of search and elapsed duration.
Point of departure of the model of the present paper is the search model by Mortensen
(1986). In this model both on the job searchers and searchers without a job are con-
sidered. To make the model suitable for empirical application some of Mortensen's
simplifying assumptions have to be relaxed. We allow for differences in cost of search for
workers and non-workers and for nonzeto cost of turnover. Moreover, differences in the
job offer arrival rate between different labour force states may occur and individuals may
prefer a certain labour force state, other things being equal. Optimal search intensity is
chosen such that the marginal cost of search is equal to the marginal returns, conditional
on scarch intensity being nonnegative. An optimal search intensity of zero may arise as
a corner solution. The expected marginal returns of search depend on the labour market
conditions, as well as on the present earnings and expected future earnings. It can be
shown thaL there is a negative relationship between present earnings and the optimal in-
tensil.y of search. For an employed individual this means that if the present wage incomc
is above a certain threshold value, he will decide not to search. This implies that there is
jointness in the decision whether or not to search and the distribution of observed wage
income. This relation can be examined using cross section data in a limited dependentL
variables rnodel. llata on search duration can be used to estirnate the relation betwrx~n
search intensity and duration. The data we use are from the Dutch Socio Lconomic
Panel. From october 1987 on questions concerning the search behaviour of individuals
appeared in the survey. Instead of having one measure for search intensity, the data set
contains several indicators for search intensity that are related to different search instru-
ments. Therefore nsearch intensity" in the structural model is allowed to be a vector of
search instruments on which the individual decides.
In section 2 the economic model is presented. In section 3 various empirical spec-
ifications are presented. First of all a reduced form model is specified in which the
employment decision, the search decision and the wage distribution are modelled jointly.
After that a structural duration model is specified which allows for transitions frorn
unemployment into employment, turnover transitions and transitions fronr employment
into unemployment. Cost of search functions are specified and differeuces in cost of
search for different labour market states are examined. The duration model is estirnated
jointly with the structural equation for search intensity and parameter estimates for the
job offer arrival rates and the cost of search functions are obtained. The estimation
results are presented. The final section concludes.
2 The economic model
The economic model is based on the model of Mortensen (1986). We extend model
in order to make it more realistic. For example, we allow the cost of search functions
and the job offer arrival rates to be different for employcd and unemployed individuals.
The within period utility level may be different for different labour force states and we
allow for the presence of nonzero cost of turnover.
[t is assumed that individuals maximize their lifetime utilit.y, taking into account
uncertainty about their future labour force state and taking into account that they can
influence the expected number of job offers by searching more or less intensely. 'I'he
within period utility function depends on the level of income in the given period. Given
the level of income there may be differences in the utility level depending on the labour
force state of the individual. The same specification for within period utility was used
by Narendranathan and Nickell (1985) and Van den Berg (1990). In their application
they found evidence in favour of "disutility of unemployment", i.e. w G 1.
utility(income-x,state-employed) - u(x)
utility(income-x,state-rmemployed) - wu(x)
with u'(x) ~ 0.
For the unemployed, job offers arrive according to a Poisson process with pararneter
(1 fa„s)a,,, which is a function of search intensity s, s) 0, that can be determined by the
individual himself, a„ is determined by the demand side of the labour market, and o„ ~ 0
is a parameter that determines the effectiveness of search. Note that at an intensity of
search of zero, the job offer arrival rate reduces to a,,, leaving open the possibility of
getting a job offered without search. As our dataset contains various indicators for the
intensity of search which provide information on the use of different search instruments,3
search intensity s, and consequently a,,, is allowed to be a vector of different search
instruments. For ease oí exposition, search intensity is treated as a one dimensional
variable in this section, but the extension to more dimensions is straightforward.
For employed individuals the job offer arrival rate is indicated by (1 f a~s)a~.
The cost of search is a function of search intensity, indicated by c„(s) for unemployed
individuals and ce(s) for employed individuals. The cost of search function is assumed





The first condition simply states no search no cost, the second condition implies more
search, higher cost and the third is a regularity condition on the cost function in order
to ensure that an optimal value of search intensity exists.
An employed individual who changes his job is faced by a cost of tutnover of k.' A
job offer is tnodelled as a random draw from a wage distribution F(.), which is assumed
to be known to the individual. For employed individuals there is an exogenous layoff
rate a. The subjective rate of discount is denoted by p.
The value function for an unemployed individual, which is the maximum of the ex-
pected lifetime utility, is indicated by V. For an employed individual who earns a wage
income of w, the value function is indicated by W(w). Below the Bellman equations are
presentcd. Their derivation is given in the appendix.
pV - max,~o {~u(b-}- p) - c„(s) ~- (1 f o„s)a„ Jó{max[V,W(x)~ - V}dF(x)}
(p -} a)W (w) -
max,~o {u(w -~ p) - c~(s)
f(1 ~ a~s)a~ f~{max[V,W(x) - k,W(w)~ - W(w)}dF(x) f vV}
(2.3)
in which 6 is benefit income and p is non-labour income, both assumed to be fixed over
time (stationarity assumption). The first equation is for unemployed individuals. }t is
equal to the within period utility evaluated at the present income b f p, minus the cost of
search, evaluated at the optimal intensity of search, plus the expected returns of search.
If an unemployed individual gets a job offer with wage x, he compares the value of being
employed at wage x, W(x), with the value of being unemployed V and he chooses the
alternative for which the value function has the highest level. This implies that the
reservation wage ~ for an unemployed individual is implicitly defined by V- W(~)2.
'I'he reservation wage income is the wage income for which the individual is indifferent,
betwcx,n working and not working. For an employed individual the same type of Bellman
equation holds.
~Van den Berg (1992) formulated a model of job to job transitiona in which he made the coat of
turnover a function of the preaent wage.
~W(.) is an increasing function otthe wage. This can be proved by contradiction: Suppose that W(.)
is non-increasing in the wage: then the right hand side o( (2.3) is increasing in the wage. The property
that W(w) is increasing in w ie aufficient to guarantee the existence of a unique reaervation wage, both
for unemployed and employed individuals4
The value function for an employed individual, who is currently employed at wage
zv, is cqual t.o the discounted value of the within period ut.ilit.y, c,valuatud at. thc~ pmsc~nt
income, minus cost of search plus expected returns of search. Not.e that. t he~ conse~qucncc~
of a uonzero layoff rate o is that thcrc~ arc di}fcrcnt discouut ratcs for c~cnployc~d aud
unemployed individuals, i.e. for the employed the discount rate is increased by v. An
employed individual who gets a job offer with wage x has three choices: he can stop
working, he can accept the job, in which case he is faced by a cost of turnover of k, or
he can keep his present job. Actually, the first alternative is irrelevant, for if V exceeded
W(w), he would not be observed to be working. For an employed individual we can
define a reservation wage a(w), which is the wage at which he is indifferent betwecn his
presentjob and the job offer, i.e. W(cz(w)) - W(w)~k. Note that if the cost of turnover
is zero, the individual will accept any job that has a higher wage than the present job.
As W'(.) 1 0, a(w) will exceed w as long as the cost of turnover k is positive.
From the Bellman equations the first order eonditions for optirnal search intensity can
be derived:
c;,(s„) - a„a„ fÉ[W(x) - V)dF(x)
s' - max{O,s„}
(2.4)
~(s~Íw)) - oe~e fa(w)[W(x) - W(o(w)))dF(x)
s~(w) - max{0, se(w)}
where use has been rnade of W(a(w)) - W(w) f k and V- W( f). s" and s~ (w) are
the optimal intensities of search for unemployed individuals and employed individuals at
wage w respectively. For positive values of search intensity the marginal cost of search are
equal to the marginal returns of search. If the solution of the marginal cost - marginal
returns equation is nonpositive, optimal search intensity will be zero.
Figure 1 depicts the cost of search and the returns of search as a function of search
intensity for an unemployed individual. The returns of search are a straight line. The
gains of search, i.e. the difference between returns and cost are maximal if the slopes are
equal, which is at s„ in the picture. In this particular case s„ is positive and consequently
the optimal search intensity s;, is positive. If the marginal returns of search rise due tu
an increase in the effectiveness of search parameter ~,,, the intensity of search at which
marginal cost of search and marginal returns of search are equal will rise as well. This is
because, due to conditions (2.2), the marginal cost of search rises with search intensity.
The higher marginal returns of search are indicated by the dotted line, and the point at
which slopes are equal is s,,. In figure 2 the situation is depicted in which it is optimal
not to search. Here the gains of search at any positive intensity of search are lower than
the gains of search at a search intensity o[ zero: The marginal cost of search are higher
than the marginal returns of search at a zero search intensity.
Accorcíing to equations (2.4) and figures 1 and `l, there is a positive~ mlal,ionship
between search intensity and marginal returns of search. Given that marginal cost of
search are positive, this relation is implied by the condition in (2.2) that states that
c~"(s) ~ 0. In the empirical implementation, this is a testable implication. The linearity
of the returns of search, together with the curved cost of search function, guarantee that
the marginal cost - marginal returns equation has a unique solution, and uníqueness is
what we need to arrive at an estimable relationship. However, linearity of the rf~turns of
search is by no means necessary for a unique solution, and the implie.d positive relation-7
ship betwecn opt.imal scarch int.ensity and rnarginal returns of search does not depend
on t hise shapes of the cost aud returns of search functions either. 1( we cboose a returns
of search specification with decreasing rnarginal returns, together with a cost of search
specification that satisfies (2.2), uniqueness and the positive relationship between search
intensity and rnarginal returns of search are maintained. The same holds for decreasing
marginal returns and a linear cost function. To test for the positive relationship be-
tween marginal returns and search intensity, we need either a linear returns of search
function and a curved cost of search function, or a linear cost of search function and a
curved returns of search function, otherwise there is no unique solution (i.e. no solution
or multiple solutions) for the marginal cost - marginal returns equation if the positive
relationship is not satisfied. Given the fact that our information on search intensity, that
is contained in thP dataset., part.ly consist.s of qualitative variables (binary indicators) of
which scale is not ident.ified, it makes little sense to test for the presence of decreasing
rnarginal returns o[ search. Therefore, we maintain the linear returns specification and
the curved cosL of search function. The expression for the marginal returns of search that
we find at. tlre right hand side of (2.4) will depend on the specific functional forms that
are chosen. However, irrespective of the chosen functional forms, marginal returns will
be decreasing in the reservation wage. As the reservation wage depends, among other
things, on current income (benefit income for unemployed individuals and wage income
for employed individuals) this implies that. there is always a negative relation between
current income and marginal returns, irrespective of the functional forms chosen.
As thc reservation wage is an important determinant of the marginal returns, we now
will corrsider the reservation wages and their relationship with search intensity in more
detail.
Above we have introduced the reservation wages, ~ and a(w) for unemployed and
employed individuals respectively, which characterize the job acceptance decision, i.e. a
job offer with a wage above the reservation wage rate will be accepted. In a similar way,
we can define a so called search reservation wage y~ for employed individuals and y„ for
unemployed individuals. The search reservation wage is the income value at which the
individual is indífferent between searching or not, i.e. it is the income value for which
marginal cost of search and marginal returns of search at a search intensitv of zero are
equal:
ar~: f~~W (~) - W(y:)~dF(x) - ~(fi), z- e, u (2.5)
v
Note from (2.4) that the marginal returns of search are decreasing in ~ and cr(w) for
unemployed and employed individuals respectively. Consequently, if ~~ y„ the marginal
returns of search will be smaller than the marginal cost of search at a zero search intensity
and it will be optimal not to search. If, in contrast, ~ G y,,, the individual can inerease
expected gains by choosing a positive intensity of search. The same holds for employed
individuals for whom we have to compare a(w) and ye.
The following relations can be defined:
Su7~ G yui~
s~(w) ~ 0 q ye 1 a(w)
Su - 0 a y„ G~
(2.6)
s~(w) - fi G y~ C a(w)6
Su
S '
G'igure 1: Determination of optimal search inl,ensity
Su
(1 f ~„s)a„ ~ [W(x) - VJdF(x)
Figure 2: An optimal search intensity of zeresi7
As o'(.) is a positive function of wage income, there is a direct relation between the
current wage income and the decision whether or not to search. As the reservation
wage ci(w) for employed rises with turnover cost k, higher cost of turnover implies lower
marginalreturns to search and therefore a decreased incentive to search.
For the employed individual we have seen that there is a negative relation between
the present wage and the intensity of search. To say something about the determinants
of the reservation wage ~ of unemployed individuals we write the Bellman equations in
a simpler form:
pV - wu(b ~ r~) - ~u(Su) t(1 t~usu)au I{[W(y) - W(f)1 dF(y)
ÍP f o)W(w) - u(w f p) - c~(s~(w)) (2.7)
f(1 f~~s~(w))~e I~wlf(w(x) - W(a(w))1dF(~) f aV
"I'he reservation wage ~ is implicitly defined by V- W'(~) or
wu(b t~) - q,(s;.) f(I f c~„s;,)~u ff (w(~) - W(~)~dF(~) -
u(E f~) - ~~(3é(~)) t(1 }~~s~(E))ae I(e)(W(x) - W(a(f))]dF(~)
2 8 (.)
From this equation, little insight is gained at first sight and therefore we start by looking
at some special cases. Suppose that o- 0, w - 1, ae - a,,, k- 0, tx~ -~„ and c„(.) -
c~(.). This is the standard case treated by Mortsensen ( 1986). It can easily be seen that
under these conditions s;, - s~(t;) and ~- 6. That is, in the absence of any differences in
the cost functions and job offer arrival rates, if cost of turnover are zero and if individuals
have no preference for a certain labour force state, the reservation income ~ is equal to
the benefit income. Any job offer with a wage income that is only one guilder higher
than the benefit income will be accepted by the individual, knowing that once he has got
a job, he can continue searching under the same conditions as when he was unemployed.
Therefore, cost of search and expected future returns have no influence on the reservation
income, which is fully determined by current income. For the decision whether to search
or not this means that if the benefit income is above the search reservation income y„
the unemployed individual will not search at all.
Now we relax the restriction w- 1, but the other restrictions remain active. Then
the reservation income is defined by u(~ f~) - wu(6 t p). If the individual prefers
being unemployed over being employed at the same income, w exceeds one and as a
consequence ~~ b. Now there is a certain threshold. The individual will not simply
accept any job with a wage that is only one cent higher than the benefit income. He needs
to be compensated for the loss in utility he incurs by changing to the less preferable state
of employment. The reverse holds for the case of disutility of unemployment, w G 1,
in which f C b. Note that the reservation wage is still determined by current period
characteristics as in both states still the same search conditions hold.
Now we relax the assumptions a~ - a,,, c„(.) - c~(.) and k- 0, allowing for differences
in the arrival rates and the cost functions. Then the reservation wage is defined by:
u(~ f l~) - wu(6 t l~) - ~(1 f tY,.s;,)~u fF ~W (2) - W(~)~dF(x) - G.(s;,)~
-[(I f a~s~(~))~~ I(~)[W(x) - W(a(E))1dF(x) - c~(s~(~))]
(2.9)Note that both sides are zero if there are no differences in the arrival rates and cost
functions and if turnover costs are zero. On the right hand side we see the difference of
the expected gains of search (returns minus costs) while unemployed and the expected
gains of search while employed at the reservation wage. If the expected gains of search
while unemployed are higher than the expected gains of search while cmployed, the
resen~ation wage rate f will be higher than in the restricted case that we described just
bc~(orc. 'fhe individual is less eagcr to accept a jub, kuowing that. oncc h~, óas a~ ~~i~ptrd
a job he enters a state in which the conditions of search are less ïavourable. 'I'he reverse
holds for the case in which the expected gains of search while employed are higher than
the expected gains of search while unemployed. Then we find tl~e reservation wage to
be lower than in the restricted case. Note that as higher cost of turnover tends to
reduce the gains of search while employed, the reservation wage r; for unemployed will
be higher as well. Finally, note that a positive layoff rate v has no conseyuences for the
reservation wage ~. A positive layofC rate decreases the value of employment, but the
value of unernployment is decreased as well as the returns of search while unemployed
depend on the expected value oí employment.
Until now the reservation wage rate o(w) for employed individuals has only been
defined implicitly by the relation W(a(w)) - W(w) f k. From the defining relation it
can be derived that
o~(w) -
u~(T" ~- Ir) P -~ Q~- (1 -~ aesé(a(w)))~eF(a(a(w)))
u~(o(w) } fi) P-F v f (1 f~esé(w))~eF(a(w))
(2.10)
It is not straightforward to solve this differentialequation. Van den Berg (1992) proposes
to use a Taylor expansion around zero costs of turnover, making use of the relation
a(w) - w t~ k- 0. In the present context this Taylor expansion is
~(w) - w } p -{- a ~- (1 f aes~~(w))~`eF(w) ~ .} o(k) (2.] 1)
u'(w f p)
with s~' - max{O,s~(w)},
~e(s~(w)) - ~eae 1~[W(y) - yy(w)~aF(y) (2.12)
w
3 Empirical specification
3.1 A reduced form specification for jointly modelling the
search decision and the wage equation
From the analysis in the preceding section it has become clear that there is a one
to one, relation between the current wage and the decision whether or not to search.
The higher is the current wage income, the less likely it is that an individual will search
Cor a job. Apart frotn the relation between the search decision and the distribution of
observed wages, there is a relation between the employment decision and the dist.ribution
of observed wages. Only wage offers that are higher than the reservation wage rate are
observed. To make inference with respect to the parameters of the wage offer distribution,9
we have to take into account that there could be correlation between the observed wages,
the ernployment decision and the search decision. In this section, a reduced form wage-
search-employment model is estimated. The estimates of the wage equation, obtained in
this subsection, can be used in the estimation of the structural model of unemployment
duration and job tenure that is described in section 3.2.
Before Lhe model is specified, some sample statistics are presented. The data are from
the Dutch Socio Economic Panel. The first wave in the panel in which information on
individual search behaviour was gathered is that of october 1987, and it is this particular
wave that we use to look at the relation between wages, employment and search.
First of all the sample is restricted to individuals who are either employed or un-
employed. This selection has been made on the basis of occupational variables in thc
sample: every individual is asked to report his or her occupation in each month of the
past half year, i.e. they are asked whether they were employed, or in full time educa-
tion, in the forces, disabled, unemployed etc. After having selected the employed and
unemployed individuals, we looked at the questions about search. The first question is
"Are you searching jor a paid job at the moment, or if you already have a paid job, are
you searching jor a different one9" The answers that the respondent can give are "Yes,
! am searching seriouslyn, "Yes, I am thinking about it", and nNo". The two different
possibilities to answer "yes" provide two different positive levels of search. If the respon-
denL has answered positivcly to this first question, some additional questions have to bc
answered. 'I'he first one is "Have you been looking jor work in the past two months?",
to which the respondent can answer yes or no. By "looking for work~ in this context
is meant responding to an advertisement, placing an advertisement, gaining information
from employers, relatives or the employment office, screening the advertisements etc.
The second question is nHow many times have you applied for a job in the past two
monthsP" By rapplying for a job~ is meant writing a letter of application, making a
phone call, etc. The final question which gains information about the intensity of search
is "Are you registered at the employment ofj~ ice?" For an individual with a positive in-
tensity of search four indicator variables st, s~, 33 and s4 can be constructed:
sr - 1 if searching seriously
- 0 if not
sz - 1 if looking for work in the past two months
- 0 if not
s3 - 1 if registered at the employment office
- 0 if not
s~ - number of applications in the past two months3
These four variables are indicators for the unobserved intensity of search. In the next
subsection, the unobserved intensity of search is modelled by a latent variable, after
which the relation between the latent variable and the indicators defined here is spec-
ified. For the purpose of the present section, it is sufficient to know whether one is
searching or not. 12espondents who answered the first question negatively are treated as
3For individuale with a backward recurrence time of one month, the measure for the number of
applicatione can be reacaled.10
Table 3.1 Sample Statistics, October 1987
~lo employed . 92.6







Io employed . 66.2
non-searchers
rounemployed . 1.8
oro employed . 98.2
employed
~o searchers . 12.4
olo non-searchers . 87.6
unemployed
Plo searchers . 79.7
01o non-searchers . 20.3
non-searchers. Moreover, individuals who answered nYes, I'm thinking about it" to this
first question, but who neither looked for a job, nor applied for a job in the past two
months, nor registered themselves aL the employment office, are treated as non-searchers
as well. All individuals for whom at least one indicator s~ is positive are classified as
searchers.
The sample consists of 3016 male individuals. Table 3.1 shows the percentages of
searchers, nonsearchers and employed, unemployed in the sample. We see that 12.4P1o
of the employed individuals is searching, whereas for the unemployed individuals the
percentage is much higher, namely 79.7. In table 3.2 we report the means of various
weekly after tax income variables. Positive non-labour income is the mean of non-labour
income restricted to those individuals who have nonzero non-labour income. The same
holds for positive benefit income. In the context of the theoretical model, the difíerences
in income between employed and unemployed individuals can be an explanation for the
fact that many more unemployed individuals than employed individuals are searchers.
There is a considerable difference between the mean wage of employed searchers and the
mean wage of employed nonsearchers. The mean wage of searchers is lower thau thc, mcan
wage of nonsearchers, which is in accordance with the thecxet.ical model in t.he pre,vious
section, which predicts a negative relation between the current wage and the decision
to search. Moreover, the non-labour income of searchers seems to be lowcr than that of
nonsearchers, which may be another incentive for them to search. For the unemployed
individuals there is not much difference between the benefit income of searchers and11
Table 3.2 Means of the weekly income variables
employecl
wage . 620.81
wage of searchers . 533.45
wage of non-searchers . 633.19
non-labour income . 18.49
non-labour income searchers . 14.85
non-labour income non-searchers . 19.01
positive non-labour income . 54.58
positive non-labour income searchers . 44.43
positive non-labour income non-searchers : 56.00
unemployed
benefit income . 203.26
benefit income searchers . 202.87
benefit income non-searchers . 204.76
non-labour income . 41.07
non-labour income searchers . 45.69
non-labour income non-searchers . 22.91
positive benefit income . 286.42
positive benefit income searchers . 288.38
positive benefit income non-searchers . 279.22
positive non-labour income . 168.85
positive non-labour income searchers . 179.71
positive non-labour income non-searchers . 114.5712
nonsearchers. If we restrict ourselves to individuals with a positive benefit income, the
mean benefit income for nonsearchers is even lower than for searchers. Moreover, non-
labour income for nonsearchers is lower than for searchers. At first sight this seems to
be in contrast with the theory in the preceding section in which benefit income was
shown t.o be an important determinant of the reservation wagc rate, and couscyue,ntly
an important determinant of the search decision in ('l.6), i.e. given everyt.hing else, the
higher the benefit income, the less likely it is that one searches. There is, however, an
alternative explanation for the fact that nonsearching individuals tend to have lower
income levels than searching individuals. The fact that these unemployed nonsearchers
have a low mean non-labour income may be due to the fact that these individuals hsve
been unemployed for quite a long time and therefore they have been using up their assets.
Having been unemployed for a long time implies that their expected returns of search
are probably low, i.e. their a„ is low. From (2.5) it can be derived that a]ow value of a,,,
given the marginal cost, leads to a low value of y,,, which is the threshold value for the
reservation wage, above which no search will take place. So even if the individuals have
low income variables, they can be observed to be nonsearching because low marginal
returns of search lead to a low threshold y,,.
Now the wage-search-employment model will be specified. It is assumed that wages
are lognormally distributed. The model is:
lnw - r~'x-}v (3.1)
yi - ázr ~- ur (3.2)
ys - i~~zz f uz (3.3)
iu which the error terms are jointly normally distributed with mean zero and covariance
matrix ~:
( Qv Qvu, Qvu~ l
E- I a,,,,, 1 v,,,,,, I (3.4)
` a,,,,z ~,,, us 1 J
Equation (3.2) is the employment equation: yi ~ 0 for employed individuals and y~ G 0
for unemployed individuals. Equation (3.3) is the search equation with yz 1 0 for
searchers and y2 C 0 for nonsearchers. The variances of the error terms of the em-
ployment and the search equation have been normalized to one. The vectors x, zr ancí
zz contain exogenous individual characteristics. Included in the vector x are log(age)
and its square, as well as four education dummies, educl, educ2, educ3 and educ4, with
educl the lowest level of educat,ion. The highest level of education has been excluded.
lncluded in the vectors zl and zz are the sum of non-labour incorne and benefit in-
come, the logarithm of family size, log of age and log of age squared, the four education
dummies, three sectoral dummíes, secl, sec2 and sec3, the regional dummies regíonl,
region2 and region3, and a dummy for marital status which is one if married and zero
if not. Secl is a dummy for education in the technical sector which includes chemistry,
physics, mathematics and biology, sec2 refers to economic and administrative education,
sec3 is general education and the fourth sector, which serves as reference sector and is
not included as a dummy, is the service sector. Regionl is a dummy for the strongly
industrialized western part of the Netherlands, Region2 is the east in wlrich there is a13
Table 3.3 The wage equation
estimate standard error
r~~ const -10.372' 0.889
r121og(agc) 9.018" 0.500
q;; syuarc of log(agc) -1.188" 0.0701
q4 educl -0.476" 0.033`l
ns educ2 -0.398"' 0.0294
ps educ3 -0.333" 0.0262
r~r educ4 -0.133" 0.0309
Table 3.4 The employment equation
estimate standard error
a~ const -4.493 3.928
az p -0.OO16S" 0.000366
a31og(fs) 0.123' 0.0696
a4 log(age) 3.354 2.218
as nationality 0.123 0.141
as educl -0.665" 0.229
a~ educ2 -0.363' 0.201
as educ3 -0.112 0.200
a9 educ4 -0.00995 0.214
a~o secl,technical -0.0604 0.131
a1~ sec2, econ. adm. -0.635 0.157
a~Z sec3,general -0.205 0.152
a~3 marital status 0.650" 0.100
a~4 regionl (west) 0.260'" 0.129
a~s region2 (east) 0.0266 0.133
a~o region3(south) 0.204 0.142
a~~ square of log(age) -0.501 0.311
mixture of industry and agriculture, Region3 is the south of the Netherlands with some
larger companies and agricultural industry and the fourth region, which is the region of
reference for which no dummy variable is included, is the remaining part with a sizeable
agrículturalsector.
Table 3.3 presents the parameter estimates of the wage equation. The double asterisks
indicate that the parameters are significant at the 5Qlo level. A single asterisk indicates
significance at the l0010 level. The age earnings profile reaches its maximum at the age
oí 44. 'I'here is a nice increasing pattern in the parameter estimates of the education
dummies, i.e. the higher the level of education, the higher is the wage income. Table
3.4 presents the parameter estimates of the employment equation (3.2). Parameter aZ of
non-labout income is significantly negative. Being married and living in the western part
of the Netherlands both have a significantly positive effect on the probability of being
employed. Educl, the education dummy associated with the lowest level of education, is
significantly negative, wheras educ2, the lowest but one level of education, is significantly14
Table 3.5 The search equation
estimate standard error
Qr const - 13.32'l" 3.836
~2 p 0.00104" 0.000357
Q31og(fs) -0.0530 0.0573
~341og(age) 8.265" 2.188
~35 nationality -0.110 0.133
Qs educl -0.00303 0.153
~37 educ2 -0.147 0.125
(j8 educ3 -0.200 0.115
~39 educ4 0.0256 0.126
~iro secl, teclrnical -0.129 0.0840
Qrr sec2, econ. adm. -0.0718 0.0977
~ir2 sec3, general -0.0559 0.0975
~ir3 rrrarital status -0.313" 0.0805
~314 regionl (west) -0.110 0.0980
(31s region2 (east) -0.00105 0.103
~3rs region3 (south) -0.209" 0.106
~il~ square of log(age) - 1.289" 0.312
Table 3.8 The covariances
estimate standard error
o„ (wage) 0.412" 0.00184
o,,,,, (wage-employment) -0.0482 0.0324
o,,,,, (wage-search) -0.0260 0.0166
a,,,,,, (employment-search) -0.858" 0.020415
negative at the lOqo leveL Log family Slze enters positively and significantly at the
lOolo level. Table 3.5 shows the parameter estimates of the search equation. Both age
parameters, Q~ and (il~ are significant and the probability of searching is maximal at
the age~ of '1.5, that is, search rises with age until the age of 25, aíter which it falls. The
dummy variablc~s educ3 and region3 are negatively related to search and the relation
betwcen being married and search is negative as well. Table 3.6 contains the covaciances
of the error tcrms. The wage-employment covariance is not significant. The covariance
Q,,,,, of wages and the search decisiorr is negative and insignificant. Remarkable is the
significance oí the age variables in both the wage equation and the search equation.
Wages rise with age until the age of 44, whereas search falls with age after the age
of 25, so there is a wide range of ages in which wages are rising and search is falling
with age. 7'his result is in accordance with the structural model, which implies that
there is a negative relation between the search decision and the current wage. Finally,
looking at the covariance o„~,,, between the error terms of employment and search we see
that there is a significant and sizeable negative correlation between the search decision
and the ernployment decision, which is in accordance with the large difference in search
percentages for employed and unemployed searchers in table 3.1.
In the theoretical model in the preceding section it can be seen from (2.4) that different
search equations for the different labour force states arise ií there are differences in the
arrival rates a„ and ~~, the cost functions c„(.) and ce(.) or if there are nonzero cost
oí turnover. With so many sources of possible differences, it is hardly believable that
employed and unemployed individuals have the same search equation. Therefore, we
repeat the above exercise, but now with different search equations for different labour
force states.
Now the model becomes
In w - rl'x f v (3.5)
yi - ázr ~- ur (3.6)
y~ - Q~z~ -}- u~ (3.7)
yu - Quzu f u„ (3.8)
The covariance matrix of the disturbances is
Q Qvu~ Qvu~ ~` v
~ - Qvu~ 1 Qu,u~ Ou,u~
ov„~ 0,,,,,~ 1 ~
. o,,,,,,, . 1
Equation (3.6) is the employment equation. Equation (3.7) is the search equation for
employed individuals and equation (3.8) is the search equation for unemployed individ-
uals. Note that the covariances between the disturbances of search and employment and
of scarch and unemployment are not identified. In case of cross section data, they do
not appcar in the likelihood function at all.
In table 3.7 the estimates of the wage equation are given. There is hardly any dif-
ference with the estimates in table 3.3. In table 3.8 the estimates of the employment
equation are given. The parameter az of p is significantly negative at the 5Qlo level. InI6
table 3.9 are the estimates of the search equation for employed individuals. 1'here are
some differences as compared to the estimates in table 3.5. Non-labour income is not sig-
nificant anymore. The age variables still play an important role and the relation betwmn
age and search is maximal at the age of 'l6. As before, the durny variables for marital
status and region3 have a significant negative effect on the probability of searching while
being employed. Table 3.10 presents the search parameter estimates for the unemployed
individuals. There are clearly diíferences between the results in this table and those in
3.5 and 3.9. None of the variables is significant. The large standard erron are due to
the low number of observations on non-searching unemployed individuals. Because of
the low number of observations we combined the higher two levels of education into one
class and consequently the dummy variable educ4 has disappeared from the equation.
For this reason, the first model is not nested in the second and therefore a likelihood
ratio test for the hypothesis that there is no difference between the two specifications is
not valid. Nervertheless, it may be useful to look at the likelihood ratio test statistic to
obtain an indication of the difference between the models. The value of the likelihood
ratio test statistic 18.9. There are 17 restrictions (17 in the parameters of the se~arch
equation, 1 in the covariance structure and -1 because of the combination of two educa-
tion level dummy variables in the search equation for the unemployed) and the critic;al
value at the 5010 level is 27.6, which implies that the hypothesis of no difference between
the two models is not rejected. This is mainly due to the limited explanatory power oí
the search equation for the unemployed individuals. The estimates of the parameters
of search equation in first model, in which there is no difference between employed and
unemployed individuals, seem to be largely determined by the observations on employed
individuals. Finally, table 3.11 shows the parameter estimates of the covariances. The
covariance between wage and employment error terms is insignificant, whereas the cor-
relation between wages and search again is insignificantly negative.
Table 3.7 The wage equation
estimate standard error
r~r const -10.315" 0.902
r~21og(age) 8.984" 0.507
r}3 square of log(age) -1.183" 0.0710
rl4 educl -0.476" 0.0334
rfs educ2 -0.400"' 0.0294
ps educ3 -0.333" 0.0262
t)~ educ4 -0.134" 0.031017
Table 3.8 The employment equation
estimate standard error
al const -5.824 4.082
az p -0.00173" 0.000347
a31og(fs) 0.118 0.0755
a41og(age) 4.133' 2.301
as nationality 0.131 0.144
as educl -0.645" 0.229
a~ educ2 -0.320 0.199
as educ3 -0.102 0.197
ay educ4 0.0484 0.211
a~o secl, technical -0.0490 0.138
a~~ sec2, econ. adm. 0.0203 0.166
a~z sec3, general -0.198 0.155
a~3 marital status 0.64J" 0.106
a~4 regionl (west) 0.295" 0.135
a~s rcgion2 (east) 0.0397 0.137
ats region3 (south) 0.185 0.148
a~~ square of log(age) -0.617' 0.323
Table 3.9 The search equation,
Employed individuals
estimate standard error
~ie~ const -IG.440" 5.699
Qez p 0.000681 0.000554
Qe3 log(fs) -0.0531 0.0618
Qe41og(age) 10.098" 3.308
Qes nationality -0.0950 0.149
,Oes educl -0.0187 0.183
Qe~ educ2 -0.105 0.133
pes educ3 -0.195 0.120
Qe9 educ4 0.0567 0.129
(ielo secl, technical -0.129 0.0856
Qet~ sec2, econ. adm. -0.0658 0.100
Qe1z sec3, general -0.0528 0.102
pc13 marital status -0.325" 0.0915
pe~4 regionl (west) -0.0895 0.105
F~el,S rcgion2 (east) -0.00187 0.108
~e~s rcgion3 (south) -0.229" 0.112
~ie~~ square ot log(age) -1.558" 0.48218
Table 3.10 The search equation,
Unemployed individuals
estimate standard error
,6„~ const -12.448 54.753
Q„2 p 0.00166 0.00748
,Q„3 log(fs) 1.384 1.041
~3„41og(age) 8.948 42.156
~3„s nationality -0.0518 0.784
~3„s educl -0.'l64 4.587
f3„~ educ2 -0.723 3.556
~3„s educ3 -0.199 1.292
~3„y secl, technical 0.313 1.159
Q,.ro sec2, econ. adm. -0.340 1.024
Q„rl sec3, general -0.541 2.368
Q„~z marital status 0.0438 3.895
Q„13 region 1 (west) -0.397 1.169
Q„~.t region2 (east) -0.192 0.451
p„ts region3 (south) -0.0940 1.036
Quts square of log(age) -1.426 6.434
Table 3.11 The covariances
estimate standard error
a„ (wagc) 0.41 ]"" 0.00194
v,,,,, (wage-employment) -0.0458 0.0418
o,,,,~ (wage-search) -0.0260 0.0172
Q,,,,,d (employment-usearch) -0.304 6.608
a,,,,,~ (employment-esearch) -O.S83" 0.129
3.2 Estimating a structural model of duration and search in-
tensity
It is well known that there is a close link between labour rnarket transitions and the
duration of labour market states. In case of a stationary model the duration of being in a
certain labour market state is exponentially distributed and its parameter can be derived
írom the search model as the product of the job offer arrival rate and the job acceptance
probability. In the present case we have a two state model in which three types of
transitions may occur: Transitions from unemployment into employment with transition
rate B„e(s„), job to job transitions with transition rate Bee(se), and transitions from
employment into unemployment with transition rate o, which is just the layoff rate frorn
section 2. Ideally, the arguments s„ and se are the observed search intensity variables for
unemployed and employed individuals respectively. Unfortunately, search intensity is not
an observed variable. In the preceding subsection, we defined four observed indicators
st,s2is3 and s4 for the intensity of search. In the present section, the unobsPrved,
latent, search intensity variables s„ and se are allowed to be four dirnensional vectors19
of (unobserved) search variables, i.e. s„ -(Sur, Su2, su3, su4)~ and sc -(s~t, s~~, 3e3, se4)~,
in which each component corresponds to one of the observed indicators. Later on, a
relation between the observed instruments sj and the latent variables will be specified.
First the distribution of unemployment duration t„ and job tenure t~ are given for the
case of a flow sarnpling scheme. "Che density of the latent search intensity vector while
employed, conditional on the wage, and the density of the latent search intensity vector
while unemployed are denoted by f~(s~) and f„(s„) respectively. Explicit expressions
for them will be given later on. Note that in the first subsection estimates for the
par.unctcrs of Lhc wagc offcr disLribution havc already bc.rn obtained, whilc accounl.ing
fur eorrclat.iun wit.h thc omploynu'nl. dccisiun and thc search dccision. As a conscqucn~ c,
we will condiLion on Lhc obscrved wages Lhroughout.
'fhc rclation betwmn thc transition intensities t1„~(s„) and t7~~(s~) and the search
model is:
9„~(s„) - (1 -F a;,s„)a„F'(st) (3.10)
B~~(s~) - ( 1 f á~sc)~eF(a(w)) (3.11)
with a;, - (aul e av4, au3, au4) and a~ -(acl , ae2, ac3, ac4). Note that the parameters a„
and ae1 that determine the influence ofsearch intensity on the transition intensities, can
be idcntified by the duration data.
Now the density functions of unemployment duration t„ and job tenure t~, conditional
on search intensity s„ and s~ and the wage rate w are:
f„(t„~s„) - 6„~(s„)exP{-9„~(s„)t„},0 G t„ G o0
fc(tc~sc) - Bc~(s~)exP{-(B~~(s~) ~- o)t~},0 G t~ C o0
job to job transitions (3.12)
j~(í~ls~) - vexp{-(Bc~(s~) -}-a)t~},0 G t~ G o0
employment to unemployment transitions
The joint density of duration and the latent search intensity vector can be obtained
by multiplying by the marginal density of search intensity, f„(s„), for unemployed in-
dividuals, or by the density of search intensity conditional on the wage for employed
individuals, which we shall simply denote by j~(s~).
Before we can derive the likelihood contributions, the relation between the latent
search intensity variables and the indicators has to be explained. For this purpose, cost
of scarcó functions c„(s) and c~(s) are specified for unemployed and cmployed persons
respecaively, where s- (sr, s~, s3i s4), with
cu(3) - ~j-1 Cu7(sj)
rsi-7viq~ - ~ 7uj9~ (3.13)
~i(si) - 7ou,j eXPI` 70u, 7o,.,jexp -70u,. J 7
ce(s) - ~~-t cci(si)
c~i(si) - 7o~.j eXP 70e,j - 7o~,i exP -70e,1 `s'-7etQI ` 7~)
(3.14)20
in which ryo,,,i, ryor,i, ryui and yPi are parameters and q is a vector of individual charac-
teristics. Note that at a zero search intensity vector the cosL of search are zero. '1'he
regularity conditions (2.2) on first and second order derivatives now are assumed to hold
for the partial derivat.ivcs of the cost function. The regularit,y condit,ions for thc, second
order derivatives of the cost of search fuuctions are satis(ied if ryo,,,~ and ryo~,~ an~ pusi-
tive, j - 1,...,4. The positivity conditions on ryoe,i and ryo,,,i will not be imposed in the
estimation.
The marginal cost - marginal returns condition ('2.4) now becornes
~i(S~i) - R,.i
~~i(sei(w)) - Rei(w),j - 1,2,3,4
with
(3.15)
Rui - ~„i~„ f~[W(x) - V]dF(x)
Rei(w) - aei~ef~w}[W(x)-W(~(w))1dF(x),j -1,2,3,4 (3.16)
Solving equations ( 3.15) and (3.16) for each j, using the specification of the cost of search
functions in (3.13) and (3.14), we obtain
s„i - ryui9 f 7o,.,i ln R„i - 7uiq f 1'ou,i[Qui -F in g(a,,, ~)] (3.17)
s~i(w) - 7ei9 f ?'o~,i ln R~i(w) - ry~iq t 7o,e[Qei -~ in g(~e, a(w))] (3.18)
with
g(a,w) - a f~[W(x)-W(w)]dF(x) (3.19)
Q,.i - ln(aui) (3.20)
Qr;i - ln(a~i) (3.21)
Note that ryo,,,i and ryoe,i determine the effect of the marginal returns of search on search
intensity. According to the theory specified in se.ction 2, the relation between optimal
search intensity and the marginal returns of search should be positive. In the empirical
application we can test for the sign of this relation.
No explicit expression for the integrand on the right hand side of (3.19) exists and
therefore we need an approximation. The integrand is approximated by 4
(P f v) [W (x) - W (w)] .~ u(x t {r) - u(w .} p) (3.22)
The function g(a,w) is approximated by g(~,w), with
9(a, w) - P} v f~[u(x -~ ~) - u(w ~ p)] dF(x) (3.23)
4Note that the integrand can be written as (p f o) [W(x) - W(w)] - u(x t{~) - u(w } ~i) -
[c~(s~(x)) - c~(a~(w))1 f (1 f ~,s~(x))aelóts~[W(í) - w(a(x))]dH'(~) - (1 f rres~(w))a~ j~'w,lW(~) -
W(a(w))]dF(i) If s~(x) - s~(w) is small, but not equal to zero, this exprension can be appr~iximated
by: (p t o) [W(x) - W(w)] ~ u(z -} p) - u(w t ~) f (s~(x) - s~(w)) {- ~(s~(w)) f R~(w)} '1'he term
between the brackets is the difference between the marginal cost of search and the marginal returns oC
search, which, in case of nonzero optimal search intensity, is zero.21
The advantage of this approximation over e.g. a Taylor expansion is that this function
has the samc derivative properties as the original, i.e. a higher wage leads to lower
returns.




Then the latent search intensities s„i and s~i are asaumed to be linked to s`uj and s~i(w)
in the following way:
Suj - 9uJ } Eu), Sej - 9eJ(w) } Eel
s„j - s„j if s„j 1 0, s~i - s~j if s~i 1 0 (3.25)
s„i - 0 if s„i G 0, s~j - 0 if s~i G 0
with Cu -(Eul, Eu2, Eu3, Eu~)~ ~ 11'(0, ~„) and e~ -(E~t, c~z, Ee3, Ee4)~ ~ N(~, E~). The
relation with the observed indicator becotnes:
.' s„j - I if s„i ~ U, s„~ - s„~ if .s„~ 1 0
- 0 if s„i - 0,j- 1,'l, 3, - 0 it s„4 - 0
(3.'lfi)
For non-searchers, s„j - 0, j- 1, 2, 3, 4. The same holds for employed individuals. The
variances of E~j, z- e, u, j - 1, 2, 3, are normalized to one.
For all of the four search indicators we observe whether or not it is positive, but if it
is positive, its value is only observed for s~, the number of applications. Therefore we
have to integrate out the unobserved values. Let f,;(s„) denote the density function of
s,,, which is normal according to (3.25) and f~ (s~) denotes the density of s~. Then the
joint density of unemployment duration and the indicator vector becomes:
Í„(('tu,s,.) -
f JA(;)f Bue(~usu)eXP{-Bue(Iusu)tu}Íu(s~l9ut,sus,8u9)fu(gur,?us,8ua)d8uldsus~u3
if s~ 1 0
f fe(.)t f Bu~(1~s„)exp{-Bu~(~~s„)~u}fo(sut,g,.s,8ua,sw)~?utds„sds„3ds,.,
if s~ - 0
(3.27)
A(s) and !3(s) are three and four-dimensional regions of integration, respectively, which
depend on the value of the indicator s. The bounds of integration are (-oo, 0) if si - 0
and (0, oo) if si - 1. 1„ is a four-dimensional indicator function, with I„i - 0 ií s„i c 0
and I„i - 1 if s„i ~ 0, indicating that if there is no search, there is no effect on the jobZ2
offer arrival rate. For employed individuals the density bcco~ncs
fe(te,se) -
I IA(;) I B ee(Iese) eXP{-(Bee(lese) } Q)te}fe (S4ISe1 ~ Se2i Se3)fe (Ser i Se2i Se3)dsel d5e2dse3
]f8qi~
I IB(è) J I Bee(IeSe) eXP{-(Bee(Iese) } Q)te }fu(ser i Se2i Se3iSe4)dse] dse2dse3dse4
ifs4-0
(job to job transitions)




(employment to unemployment transitions)
(3.`L8)
le is a three-dimensional indicator function with Ie; - 0 if seJ G 0 and ]e; - 1 if s,,; ~ 0.
To evaluate the likelihood contribution, we need to calculate three and four dimensional
integrals of normally distributed random variables. This problem can easiliy be handled
by using the smooth recursive conditioning algorithm (SRC) for simulating multidi-
mensional integrals over normally distributed random variables and applying simulated
maximum likelihood (SML) as described in Bórsch-Supan and Hajivassiliou (1993).
The endogeneity of search int,ensity has consequences for the joint density in case c,f
a stock sampling scheme. The derivation of the joint density of duration and search
intensity, conditional on backward recurrence times is given in appendix B.
The reservation wage for unemployed individuals can be calculated by solving ~ from
the implicit equation (2.8). The solution can be used to determine search intensity
equation. To calculate the transition intensity B„e(s„), s;, is replaced by s„ in (2.H).
For employed individuals, the reservation wage a(w) is calculated by means of the
Taylor approximation (2.11), where s~'(w) is replaced by se in the calculation of the
conditional distribution of duration .
In the estimation of the structural model the following approach will be followecí. F'irst
of all the pararneters of the wage distribuf,ion will be fixed to the paramet,ers obtained by
the estimation of the reduced form model, described in the previous subsection. I~'rom
the structural model in section 2 it has become clear that a structural specification of the
distribution of observed wages would depend in a complicated way on the employment
situation and the search decision. For a structural model of the wage parameters it is not
enough to know the labour market state and the income variable at the point of sampling:
Also information about previous labour market states is required. Although the use of
reduced form estimators of the wage parameters will lead to inefficíent estimat.ors of the
remaining model pararneters, in practice the gains of estimating the wage parainc~Lers
structurally will not outweigh the cost that is due to the intractibility of the model.
A joint model of duration and search intensity will be estimat.ed, conditional on the
wage. The parameters a,,, ~e, ~,,, ~e, ry,., rye, ryo,u, ryo,c, ~, a and k can be obtained by
the (simulated) maximum likelihood principle.23
For the utility function u(x) a linear specifications is chosen. According to (2.1) the
linear specification is:
utility(income-x,state-employed) - x
utility(income-x,state-unemployed) - ~x (3.29)
The cost oí turnover can be parametrized as:
k - b'c (3.30)
in which b is a parameter vecaor and c is a vector of individual characteristic~. A„ and




in which z is a vector of individual characteristice and K„ and K~ are parameter vectors.
To restrict the number of parameters we assume that
7u; - d,~;7~,~,.r - 1,J - 1,2,3,4 (3.32)
ry~; - ~~;7~,~~r - 1,J - 1,2,3,4
where 19„~ and t9~~ are scalars. The economic argument in favourof this type of restriction
is thal t.he fonr measurex s~ are all indicators for search effort. The restriction implies
that there is a single index, ry~q for unemployed and ry~q for employed individuals, which
specifies tlre effect of individual r.haracteristics on cost oi search. Suppose that there
would exiat a variable called nsearch effortn, which is a weighted sum of the latent
variables s„~ and s~~, for unemployed and employed individuals respectively. Then the
structrrral equation for this variable would be of the same form as (3.17)-(3.18)-(3.25),
i.e. linear in q and and log-linear in R„ or R~, and the cost of search function of this
variable would be of the same form as c„;(.) and c~;(.) in (3.13) and (3.14).
3.3 Data and estimation results
Table 3.12 provides sample statistics of the sample of employment search spells as
well as the sample of unemployment search spells. Table 3.13 presents sample statistics
for spells of non-searchers. In the sample we only consider single spells of employment
and unemployment. This is done for sevetal reasons. First oí all to relax the effects
of the stationarity assumption. If we would estimate a multiple spell model, we would
have to assume that the individual characteristics in the transitions intensities are the
same throughout all spells ofemployment and unemployment, which is rather unrealistic.
Second the indicators of search intensity are only observed twice a year, in the months
in which the survey is conducted. Therefore, for shorter spells which are in between the
survey months, search intensity is not observed. Third, using a multiple spell model it
would not be posaible anymore to condition on the wage rate, which makes te model
intractable.
'I'lic following sampling scheme is used. All individuals who are either employcd
or urremployed, are sampled from the survey wave of october 1987. ln addition, all
individuals who are employed or unemployed in april 1988, and whose spell started24
after october 1987, have been sampled from the wave of april 1988. Finally, all spells of
individuals who are unemployed in october 1988, and whose spell started after april 1988
have been added. In all cases we have to correct for the fact that we do not observe spells
in between the survey months, which can be done by using the stock sample density for
all observations, which is derived in appendix B.
The total sample of spells of employed searchers consists of 500 observations. 1'l7
of these spells are completed spells. The observation period ends in october 1988. The
sample of spells oí unemployed searchers consists of 312 observations. For 139 0[ these
spells are completed spells. For the spells of unemployed individuals the obscrvation
period ends in april 1989.
The sample of spells of non-searchers consists of 2806 observations, which can be
divided in 2766 employment spells and 40 unemployment spells. For the employed 171
job to job transitions occur, whereas 165 transitions into unemployrnent take place. The
number of unemployment spells that is completed is 13.
Comparing spells of searchers and spells of non-searchers we can say that 3310 of the
non-search unemployment spells ends with a transítion into ernployment, whereas the
number is 45~o for search unemployment spells. For the non-search employment spells
6oI'o ends with a job to job transition, whereas 25oI'o of the search employment spells ends
with a job to job transition. óolo of the non-search employment spells ends by a transition
into unemployment whereas the number is 4a1o for the search employment spells.25
Table 3.12 Sample atatistica, searchers
Employed
variable mean atandard deviation
age 32 7.8
family sizc (persons) 3.2 1.3
educat.ion level mode 3
Dutc}i nationality 96.6qo
region 1 (industrialized west) 44.4~0
region 2 (east) 24.8qo
region 3 (south) 20.S1o
region 9 (agricultural) 10.0~
married 65.6010
sector of education 1(technical) 28.6010
sector of education 2(economic~administrative) 17.4~0
sector of education 3(no apecialization) 27.6010
sector of education 4(servicea) 23.4010
Unemployed
variablc mean standard deviation
agc 31 11.7
family size (persons) 3.0 1.6
education level mode 1
Dutch nationality 92.3qo
region 1 (industrialized west) 37.2010
region 2 (east) 27.9iro
region 3 (south) 23.4010
region 4 (agricultural) 11.5~0
married 35.5~0
sector of education 1(technical) 24.410
sector of education 2(economic~administrative) 10.6010
sector of education 3(no specialization) 52.6010
sector of education 4(servicea) 11.20102s
Table 3.13 Sample statistics, non-searchers
Employed
variable mean standard deviation
age 38 10.7
family size (persons) 3.3 1.3
education level mode 3
Dutch nat.ionalit,y 9(i.4o~o
n~gion l (industrializc~d wcst) .1:3.Or~o
region 2 (east) 23.8~10
region 3 (south) 23.l010
region 4 (agricult.ural) lO.IPIo
married 76.6010
sector of education 1(technical) 34.4~10
sector of education 2(economic~administrative) 17.S~o
sector of education 3(no specialization) 27.7qo
sector of education 4(services) 19.3e1o
Unemployed
variable mean standard deviation
age 47 15.4
family size (persons) 2.4 1.2
education level mode 1
Dutch nationality 95.O~o
region 1 (industrialized west) 4'2.5~0
region 2 (east) 35.O~o
rcgion 3 (south) 5.OJo
rcgion 4 (agricultural) 17.5~0
married 57.5P1o
sector of education 1(technical) 17.5~0
sector of education 2(economic~administrative) lO.OQIo
sector of education 3(no specialization) 50.Oo1o
sector of education 4(services) 20.O~1o
In the vector z in (3.31) the following characteristics are included: A constant term,
log of age and log oí age squared, Lhe Lhree sectoral durnmies aecl, sec2, aud sec3,
that have already been described in section 3.1, the regional durnmy variables regionl,
region2 and region3, the three education dummies educl, educ2 and educ3, a dumrny
for marital status and a dummy for nationality. There are too few observations to
make the layoff rate Q dependent on individual characteristics. In the vector q, which
contains characteristics of the cost of search functions in (3.13) and (3.14 ), we includc~ Lhe
logarithm of family size, a dummy variable for marital status, as well as t.he logarithm of
agc and its square. In the turnover cost k in (3.30) we include two age dummy variablc,s:
agedutnl for individuals aged '30 or lowcr, and agcdum2 for individuals agcd bc~t.wcxn
30 and 45. Two dummy variables are included which are concerned with the training
period required for the worker's present job. If an individual had to spend much time27
to get settled in his present job, turnover cost is likely to be higher than in absence of
a training period. The first dumnry variable is called trainperl, which is equal to one iC
there is no training period or if the respondent does not know the length of the training
period. The second dummy, trainper2, is for persons with a training period with a length
that is less than half a year. The reference group includes those individuals who have a
job for whicli a training period is required that is half a year or longer.
The estimation results oí the structural model are reported in the tables 3.14 through
3.20. 'The rate of time prefererrce p has been fixed, such that on a yearly basis the discount
rate is 5QIo. The number of replications used for simulating probability integrals by mearrs
of the smooth recursive conditioning algorithm is 20. In the table a double asterisk
indicates significance at the 5qo level, whereas a single asterisk indicates significance at
the 10~0 level.
First we discuss the parameters ~~ which establish the part of the job offer arrival
rate for employed individuals that is determined by the demand side of the labour mar-
ket. The estimates are presented in table 3.14. The dummy variable sec2 (parameter
Ke5), which corresponds with the economic and administrative sector, has a significantly
positive effect on a~. As the reference sector is the sector of services, this implies that
individuals with an economic or administrative education have a significantly higher job
offer arrival rate than individuals in the service sector. The education dummy educl
is significant. Both age variables, log(age) and its square, are significant determinants
of the arrival rate. The values of the estimates indicate that a, falls with age at an
incrcasing ratc.
Thc parameter estimate of the layoff rate o is small but significant.
Comparing the parameter estimates of the effectiveness of search parameters a~~, ar2
and a~~, which deterrnine the effectiveness oF search of respectively attitude, screenir~g
and number of applications, we see that attitude has a large effect on the probability of
getting a job offer as compared to the remaining two search instruments. In comparing
the effectiveness of the three search instruments, the scale oi the variables has to be taken
into account, i.e. the variances of the attitude and screening variables are normalized
to one, whereas the vatiance of the application instrument has been estimated. Even
after accounting for scale, the effect of the number of applications on the number of
job offers remains surprisingly low. The standard errors of à~z (screening) and á~4
(applications) are high relative to the pacameter estimates. Note that a formal test for
~~~ - 0 is not possible: Under the null, marginal returns of search would always be zero
and consequently nobody would search. The fact that individuals g~e making use of the
search instruments indicates that at least they expect search to be effective.
The estimates the cost of search function parameters for employed individuals,
ry~~, j - 1,...,5 are presented in table 3.15. The characteristics that are related to the
household composition do not play any role. The age variables (parameters y~~ and
7~s) are significant. The cost of search falls with age until the age oí 30, after which it
rises. The parameters y~~ which determine the effect of marginal returns of search on
the intensity of search are all positive and significant, which is in accordance with the
regularity conditions that are assurned to hold in the economic model.
The cstimates of the cost of turnover parametera, ó~, ..., Á5t are presented in table 3.16.
Notc Lhat Lhc cost of turnover, as it ha~ been introduced here, only serves as a rclaxationof the functional form of the transition intensity B~~(s~), as no data on reservation wages
are available5 This means that we have to be careful in interpreting the estimates of
turnover costs. None of the cost oí turnover parameters are signifiantly different. frorn
zcro.
'Phe arrival rate parameters a„ for unemployed individuals can be found in table
3.18. The age parameters are significant. The estimates suggest that ~„ rises with age,
which seems counterintuitive. Living in the southern part of the Netherlands ( region3,
parameter ~c„y) adds positively to the job offer arrival rate. The parameter estimate of
the education dummy variable educ2 is significantly positive.
The utility parameter w exceeds one, but is not significantly different from one, which
means that we cannot say that there are differences in utility levels associated with the
two different labour market states.
As for the employed individuals, we see that the attitude variable influences the
arrival rate strongly. For unemployed individuals the number of applications has nruch
more effect than for the employed individuals. Being registered at the employment
office seems to be the least effective instrument of search. Comparing the pararneter
estimates with the standard errors, we see that the standard errors for attitude, screening
and applications are low as compared to the the estimates. For the employmenL ofFice
parameter this is not the case.
1'he estimates of the cost of search parameters ry„„j - 1, ..., 5, are shown in table 3.19.
Family size has a significant and positive effect on the intensity oÏ search. The larger
the family, the more effort is spent on search. In the extended search model of Burdett
and Mortensen (1978) cost of search arises from a loss in utility, as a higher intensity of
search implies that less time can be devoted to leisure. From this point of view, having a
larger family affects preferences such that the individual is willing to allocate less time to
leisure and more time to search. Cost of search is increasing with age. The parameters
ryo,,,~, that determine the effect oí marginal returns of search on search intensity, all are
significantly positive, which again is in accordance with the assumptions underlyiog the
economic model.
In conclusion we can say that, for both unemployed searchers and employed searchers,
the theoretical result that marginal returns of search should increase the intensity of
search, is not rejected by the estimation results. For employed individuals, search inten-
sity varies with age: it increases with age until the age of 30, after which it decreases.
For unemployed persons, family size is an important determinant of search intensity. If
we consider the measure of search intensity to be a proxy for time spent on search, the
significance of family size can be explained in terms of allocation of time to search ac-
tivities and leisure. For both employed and unemployed individuals, the attitudc seems
to be an important determinant of search intensity in terms of effectiveness of search.
For employed individuals, the number of applications does not seem to be very effec-
tive, whereas for une.mployed individuals the number of applications is effective. Being
registered at the employment office is the least effective instrument of search for the
unemployed individuals.
SVan den Berg (1992) uses data on reservation wages to estimate the turnover costs by minirnizing
the squared difference between observed reservation wagea and theír theoretical expreseions.29





xe~ (const) -9.757" 1.558
x„~ (log(agc)) 4.720" 0.877
xe3 (syuarc of log(age)) -0.96?" 0.136
xN (seCl) 0.023 0.168
xes (sec2) 0.343' 0.187
x~ (sec3) -0.005 0.194
xe7 (region 1) 0.205 0.198
xes (region2) -0.034 0.220
xes (region3) 0.097 0.214
xe~o (educl) 0.503" 0.238
xe~~ (ecluc2) 0.308' 0.178
xe~s (educ3) 0.031 0.162
xe13 (marital status) 0.055 0.148




ael (attitude) 25.739 4.092
aez (screening) 0.156 0.161
aeq (applications) 0.0022 0.002830
Table 3.15 Estimates of the structural model
Employed individuals
The cost of search function
estimate standard error
COS1' OF SEARCH INDICAI'OR y~q
rye~ (constant) -21.40" 4.612
yez (log(family size)) -0.041 0.060
rye3 (marital status) 0.075 0.080
ryeq (log(age)) 11.70" 2.967
ryes (square of log(age)) -1.722" 0.393
EFFECT OF RETURNS OF SEARCH ON SEARCH INTENSITY
ryoe,l (attitude) 0.087" 0.043
~ioe,2 (screening) 0.176"' 0.044
ry~e,4 (applications) 0.864" 0.177
PAI~.AMI;'I'ER, ,9~
i9,.z (scrc~~ning) U.84!)" U.109
~ea (aPPlications) 1.45'l" 0.683




ól (constant) -9.641 9.044
óz (ageduml) 190.0 241.3
ó3 (agedum2) - 109.7 226.0
ë4 (trainperl) 385.8 285.0
ós (trainper2) 247.2 278.7
Table 3.17 Estimates of the structural model
Employed individuals
Parameters of error distribution, ~e
estimate standard error
ae,lz (covariance attitude-screening) 0.936" 0.009
ae,14 (covariance attitude-applications) 1.938" 0.067
~e,z4 (covariance screening-applications) 2.097" 0.063
oe,4 (standard deviation applications) 2.248" 0.07231





K„~ (runa.) - -- - 4.aa(i" I.8411
K„z (log(agc)) -2.638" 0.752
K„~ (squarc o[log(age)) 0.453" 0.174
K„~ (secl) 0.341 0.509
Ku5 (sec2) 0.581 0.630
w„~: (si,~:1) 0.'l84 0.4fi7
K„7 (regionl) -0.`L91 0.462
K„a (region2) -0.278 0.455
Kyg (region3) 1.051" 0.478
K„~o (educl) 0.635 0.525
K„~~ (educ2) 1.199" 0.498
K„rz (educ3) 0.542 0.504
K„i3 (marital status) 0.312 0.414




~„r (attitude) 23.999 8.232
a„z (screening) 0.341 0.154
a„3 (employment office) 0.097 0.056
ct„~ (applications) 1.507 . 0.50632
Table 3.19 Estimates of the structural model
Unemployed individuals
The cost of search function
estimatc standard crror
COST OF SF.ARCH INDICATOR yuq
ry„1 (constant) - 1.906" 0.314
ysz (log(family siae)) 0.168" 0.021
y„3 (marital status) -0.030 0.029
ry„a (log(age)) -0.665" 0.261
7us (square of log(age)) 0.025 0.039
EFFECT OF RETURNS OF SEARCH ON SEARCH INTENSITY
yo,,,l (attitude) 0.450" 0.024
ryo,,,z (screening) 1.523" 0.349
yo,,,3 (employment office) 1.857" 0.349
ryo,,,a (applications) 1.291" 0.222
PARAMETER ,9„
r9„z (screening) 1.478" 0.494
t9„3 (employment ofi'ice) 1.366" 0.437
r9„a (applications) 1.043" 0.361
Table 3.20 Estimates of the structural model
Unemployed individuals
Parameters of error distribution, 2~„
estimatc standard crror
v,,,1z (covariance attitudc-scrcening) -0.091" 0.017
v,,,ta (covariance attitude-employment office) 0.183' 0.107
o,,,la (covariance attitude-applications) -2.679" 0.29`?
o,,,z3 (covariance screening-employment office) 0.292" 0.107
~,,,3a (covariance employment office-applications) 0.380 0.396
a,,,za (covariance screening-applications) 2.400" 0.264
Q,,,a (standard deviation applications) 4.384" 0.31433
4 Conclusions
W~ have specified an empirical version of the search model of Mortensen (19H6), in
which the intensity of search is a choice variable for the individual. A higher level of
sc~arch intensity increases the job offer arrival rate, but at the same time cost of search
rises. 1'he individual chooses the intensity of search on the basis of a comparison of
marginal returns of search with marginal cost of search. We allowed for differences in
arrival rates between the state of employment and the etate of unemployment. This
means that there are differences in search conditions for different labour force states.
We have scrrn that these differences in search condit.ions affect the reservation wage for
individuals in the state of unemployment. The better the search conditions in the state
of unernployment, as compared to the search conditions in the state of empioyment, the
higher the reservation wage for individuals in the state of unemployment.
If cost of turnover is zero, the reservation wage in the employment state ia equal to
the present wage. Positive turnover cost raises the reservation wage in the employment
state. As higher cost of turnover deteriorates the search conditions while employed, the
reservation wage for unemployed persons rises as well.
According to the assumptions underlying the economic model, higher marginal returns
of search should increase the intensity of search. In the empirical application, we have
tested for this implication of economic theory and it could not be rejected.
In the empirical model we used data on job duration and unemployment duration
and several indicators of search intensity to estimate the model parameters. The cost
of search for employed persons is largely determined by age patterns. Cost of search
decrease until the age of 30, after which they increase. For unemployed persons family
size is a significant determinant of coat of search. A larger family leads to lower cost of
search and consequently to a higher intensity of search. Cost of search is increasing with
age for unemployed persons.
We have not found significant evidence in favour of differences in preferences with
respect to different labour market states.
Estimates of the arrival rate reveal evidence about the relative effectiveness of different
search instruments. For both employed and unemployed persons, the search intensity
indicator that measures the individual's attitude towards search strongly influences the
arrival rate. This may partly be due to the possibility that the attitude variable picks up
search intensity channels that cannot be assigned to one ofthe remaining three indicat.ors
of search. Itather surprisingly we found that the number of applicationa has not much
effect [or employed individuals. For unemployed individuals the number of applications
has a stronger effect on the arrival rate. Being registered at the employment office is the
least effective search inatrument for unemployed persons. In conclusion we can say that
there are di(ferences in the effectiveness of different search instruments.A The Bellman equations
First the expression of the value function, V, for unemployed individuals is derived.
We consider the events in a small time interval of length Ot. At present, the individual
is unemployed, is earning a benefit income of b and a non-labour income p. The within
period utility flow in a time interval with length Ot is wu(b f p)Ot. If the individual
is searching during Ot, the cost of search are c„(s)Ot. The current period contribution
to V is (cau(b f p) - c„(s))Ot. At the end of the interval Ot he may or may not obtain
a job offer. The number of job offers obtained in an interval of length Ot is Poisson
distributed with parameter (1 ~ a„s)a„Ot, so the probability of receiving a job offer is
e-(rtrY.')a„ne(1 -f a,,s)a„Ot f o(Ot), whereas the probability of receiving no job offcr is
1- e-t~}a~")auet(1 ~ o„s)a„~t ~ o(Ot). Ií a job offer is obtained with wage income x a
choice can be made between accepting the job with value W(x) or rejecting with value
V. Therefore, the expected future value is E~max(V,W(x)]. In absence of a job offer
the value remains equal to V. The discount factor is e-pet. The value function becomes:
V- maxa~o [(u(b -f p) - G,(s)) Otf
.e-ver je-(rta.d)a,.ee(1 -b ~„s)a„OtE~max[V, W(x)]





max,~o [wu(b ~- p) - c„(s) -~ C-tGftl~a„s)a„)nt(1 t~,.s)a„ {E~ max[V, W(x)] - V})
(A.2)
Letting Ot -a 0:
pV - m~óx [wu(6 ~} p) - c„(s) ~ (1 f a„s)~„ {E~ max[V, W (x)] - V }] (A.3)
Replacing the expectation sign by the integral over the wage distribution yields the first
equation of (2.3).
For individuals who are currently working at wage w the value function is denotr~d by
W(w). The current period contribution to the value function is (u(w ~- ti) - ce(s))Ot.
At the end of interval L1t four events may occur. With probability (P.-t~ta~s)a,e~O ~
aes)ae~t fo(L1t))(1 -otlt) - e-trto~')a~et(1-~~~s)~e0t f o(~t) a job offer with wage x
is obtained by the individual, while he is not laid off. If he accepts, he has to pay turtrover
costs k. The alternatives are to remain in his present job or to become unemployed. The
value for thc. event is max[V,W(x) - k,W(w)]. The sccond evc~nt is that, of gc~tting a
job offer and being laid of. Now the alternative of remaining in his present job disap-
pears. The probability of the event is (e-trto~')a~et(1 ~- aes)ae0t f o(Ot))vtlt - o(Ot)
with value max[V,W(x) - k]. The third event is that of neither getting a job offer, nor
being laid off. The probability is (1 - e-tr}a'')a'et(1 f~~s)ae0t -} o(~t))(1 - o0t) -
1- e-trtQ~')a~et(1 -f a~s)a~~t - atlt -~ o(L1t) with value max[V, W(w)] - W(u~). Fi-
nally, he may be laid off without getting a job offer. This event has probabilil.y
(f - e-(rta~,)a~ne(1 ~ a~s)a~Ot t o(Ot))a0t - 00l ~ o(Ol). The valuc funct,ion be-35
cornes:
W(w) -
max.~o [(u(w f ir) - c~(s))Ot
~,e-onr je-ttto..)a.ne(1 ~ a~s)a~DE~ max[V, W(x) - k, W(w)]f
(1 - e-(lrta.,)a~n`(1 f n~s)a~Ot - o0t)W(w) -} oOtV}~ .} o(Ot)
Rcarrangiug terms, dividing by Ot and letting Ot --. 0 yields
(P f ~) W(w) -
max,~o [u(w f p) - c~(s) f a~s {E~[V, W(x) - k, W(w)] - W(w)} ~- aV]
'Chis is the eyuivalent of the second equation in (2.3).
(A.4)
(A.5)
B The stock sample density
The stock sample density of duration and search intensity, conditional on the back-
ward recurrence time is derived. The analysis is based on Ridder (1984). The subindices
e and u, indicating the labour force state, will be suppressed. Let f(t~s,w) denote the
flow conditional density of duration, conditional on search intensity and the wage. To
rcduce the necessary notation, search intensity is treated as a observed continuous non-
negal.ivc random variable here. The extension to multidimensional variablrs o[ the typc
in sect.ion 3.2 is straightforward. Let f(s~w) denote the density of search intensity con-
ditional on the wage, and let g(w) denote the marginal density of observed wages. Theu
the joint 8ow denaity of duration, search intensity and observed wagea is
f(t~s,w)f(s~w)g(w),0 G t G o0,0 G s G oo (B.1)
Now assume that the inflow rate into the given labour force state is i(-p,1), in which -p
denotes the time of inflow into the state, if the point of sampling is taken as reference,
and l is calendar time. The stock density is the flow denaity, conditional on entrance at
p time units ago, and conditional on duration t exceeding the backward recurrence time
p. Then the joint stock density of duration, backward recurrence time, search intensity
and observed wages is:s
h(P,t,s,w) - o0 00
oo(-P,l)f(~s,w).f(sIw)g(w)




We are interested in the stock density of duration and search intensity, conditional on
the wage and the backward recurrence time, i.e.
h(t, s~P, w) -
h(P, t, s, w) (B.3)
h(p, w)
BNote that we treat the eubsample otemployment epella and the subeample otunemploymentspelle as
two separate samples here. lieatingthem as one sample changes the eelectivity correction in h(p, t, s, w),
but leavee the final result, i.e. the deneity conditional on backward recurrence times, unaffected.36
in which ~ ~
h(p, w) - I I h(p, t, s, w)dtds
O p
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